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Delegation of Legislative Power-the
Constitutionality of the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970
With the passage of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,1 a very
fundamental constitutional problem has once again come to the fore.
The Act has granted to the President, in the very broadest terms, the
power to regulate and control the economy of the United States. Such
a pervasive grant of authority carries with it various constitutional
implications; but the concern here is with the congressional delegation
of power to the President.
Article I, section 1, of the Constitution provides, "All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.... ." This is a very broad and a very general statement of an in-
tent to establish a congress, and to confer upon it the power to make
the laws. But, beyond this, what does it mean? What effect has this
provision on the manner in which Congress seeks to exercise its legis-
lative power?
In case after case, for more than 150 years, the Supreme Court has
faced these questions. The long line of answers which the Court has
given comprises what has come to be known as the delegation doctrine.
It is important to closely examine this doctrine, and the theory
which underlies it. If this doctrine is to be employed to weigh the con-
stitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act, something must first
be known about the measuring device to be employed.
I. UNDERLYING THEORY-SEPARATION OF POWERS
Article I, section 1, places all legislative powers in a Congress; Article
II, section 1, places all executive powers in the President; while Article
III, section 1, places judicial powers in a Supreme Court, and in those
inferior courts which may be provided. These provisions do more than
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1904, note (1964).
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that however, they reflect a strong commitment to the theory of a
separation of powers. This is a very fundamental theory, the wisdom
of which can be traced down through the history of human experience
and thought. Its principles were enunciated by Aristotle in his Politics,
by Locke in his Two Treatises of Government, and by Montesquieu in
his Spirit of the Laws.
The basic theory is very simple; in order for liberty and justice to
prevail under government, it is necessary that no person or body be
allowed to wield absolutely, or even predominantly, the powers of
government. Montesquieu phrased it:
Political liberty ... is there only when there is no abuse of power,
but constant experience shows us, that every man invested with
power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will
go .... To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature
of things, power should be a check to power . . . IWhen the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.2
Colonial belief in separation of powers was a product of both philo-
sophical precedent, and their own historical experiences. 3 A distaste for
executive and judicial offices controlled by royal governors and mon-
archs contributed immensely toward their affinity for separation of
powers.4 Many state constitutions demonstrated the strong belief in
separation of powers by explicitly incorporating the theory.5 For ex-
ample, the Massachusetts Constitution provides:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative depart-
ment shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never ex-
ercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the
end it may be a government of laws and not of men."
Separation of powers in the Federal Constitution was never so rigidly
2. EBENSTEIN, GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 428 (1965).
3. Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 529 (1969).
4. Id. at 530.
5. Id.
6. MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
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stated; but the establishment of a tri-partite system nevertheless evi-
dences the theory in practice. The vesting of the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers in three distinct branches clearly reflected a deep
distrust for centralized governmental powers.7
The less rigid formulation of the Federal Constitution also evi-
dences a purpose to reconcile the theory of separation of powers with
the need for effective national government.8 The separation of powers
approach as established in the Constitution was meant to be a workable
concept; and this was as true in 1789 as it is today.9 As one writer has
pointed out:
[W]e should in sum, keep in mind that the great end of the
theory is to prevent absolutism, by dispersing in some measure the
centers of power. It is not eternally to stratify our governmental
arrangements in the particular mold of 1789. If the exact form at
any moment of history were taken as a literal prescription, it
would strangle the process of government. 10
The job of defending the separation of powers, while permitting
effective governmental operation, has devolved from the very beginning,
upon the courts. This is as it should be, for it is consistant with the
rationale of the separation doctrine. If a tri-partite system, based on
separation of powers, is to be effective, each co-equal branch must
perform the checking function intended by the Constitution. The
courts are to effectuate the Constitution and the laws of the land; and
this involves a maintenance and adherence to the policies and principles
inherent in the Constitution and the laws.
Through the years the Court has played a significant role in balanc-
ing the necessities of government with the requirement of separation of
powers. The role of the Court as an arbiter of the extent and scope of
governmental powers has been a significant limitation on legislative
and executive authority."
The process by which the courts have balanced necessity with theory
has come to be known as the delegation doctrine. Let us now examine
the process, and the doctrine.
433
7. Forkosch, supra note 3, at 531.
8. Id.
9. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 32-33 (1965).
10. Id. at 29.
11. Forkosch, supra note 3, at 533.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE-PRAGMATIC
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The delegation doctrine is based on the separation of powers theory.
To understand the doctrine, it is necessary to understand what the
separation of powers theory requires in practice.
One must be aware that when Montesquieu wrote his treatise, he had
in mind a "political theory, which at that time was nowhere realized
in fact."1 2 Likewise, when the framers of the Constitution wrote that
great document, the theory had not yet been put into practice; and
"historically there had never been a government in which legislative,
executive, and judicial functions-or at least two of them-were not
united in the same branch.' u3 The result being, that no one, including
the founding fathers, and the Supreme Court which was about to face
the question, knew exactly the extent to which governmental powers
could effectively be separated. It is fairly certain, however, that the
theory was never intended to be a rigid one. It has been said that
"separation of powers has probably always been understood to be an
expression of a general attitude, rather than an inexorable table of or-
ganization. So understood it is a valuable element of political wisdom."14
In the earliest cases, in which delegation of legislative power was
attacked as violative of the Constitution, the Court realized that a
rigid separation of functions was not practical. It also realized that no
absolute formula could be used in determining which power must be
exercised by Congress alone, and which powers could be delegated.
However, it was clear the most important factor the Court would have
to take into consideration would be the need for effective governmental
operation.
The issue which arose in those early cases has continued to be the
same issue raised in delegation cases today. Is the power to perform a
given governmental task being properly divided and exercised, as
between the legislative branch which must initiate policy, and the
executive branch which must execute policy? Stated in another fashion
-has Congress adequately exercised its duty and its power to effectuate
policy, or has it failed to do so by improperly delegating this power
to an executive or administrator?
To state the problem in this manner would seem to imply that the
12. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892, 894 (1918).
13. Id.
14. L. JAFFE, supra note 9, at 28-29.
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power necessary to perform a governmental task can be divided with
precision between a legislative body and an executive body. By stating
the issue in this manner, it was not intended that such an implication
should arise. Such an implication carries with it the erroneous assump-
tion that governmental power can be systematically and schematically
defined according to some pre-existing notion. Both the nature and
quantity of governmental power varies in relation to each specific
governmental task, the accomplishment of which is sought.
By so phrasing the issue, I mean to raise the specter of an approach
to congressional delegation and separation of powers which is basically
a pragmatic one.
When facing a delegation case, the only absolute with which the
court can deal is Article I of the Constitution. But this is not much in
the way of an absolute when one considers that it merely establishes a
Congress, and gives to that Congress the power to initiate policy. It
does not require that Congress perform all policy-making functions,
but it certainly requires that it perform some.
How much policy making power must Congress exercise? As has
already been said, the answer does not lie in a schematic division of
functions, but in a pragmatic evaluation of the necessities of govern-
ment. If separation of powers is to be a working concept, it must be a
pragmatic concept.
When the founding fathers retired the Articles of Confederation for
the new Constitution, their primary purpose was to establish an effec-
tive, working system. Yet, separation of powers was an important con-
sideration, not to be lightly disregarded. Although the founding fathers
abandoned the ineffectual Articles primarily to establish more effective
government; it must not be forgotten they also abandoned the unitary
system of government established under the Articles in favor of a system
in which powers were separated. 15 A balancing between effective govern-
ment and separation of powers was certainly intended and expected.
They must surely have been meant to work in harmony.
For the courts, which have faced the constitutional issue, a pragmatic
approach of this type necessitates a case-by-case analysis. The fine
constitutional line between proper use of congressional power, and im-
proper delegation, has never been drawn with precision. The factors
which go into determining whether Congress has properly exercised a
15. The Articles of Confederation created only one arm of government-Congress. See
U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V.
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sufficient amount of its power vary from case to case. Nevertheless,
the pragmatic approach has been the fundamental thread which has
run through every delegation case which the Supreme Court has de-
cided.
Although pragmatic separation of powers is the basic approach under-
lying the Court's decisions, the concept has taken many forms, and has
been verbalized in many ways. The sum total of these various formula-
tions and verbalizations has come to be called the delegation doctrine.
Some of the early cases, such as The Brig Aurora16 and Field v.
Clark17 created confusion in the analysis of the delegation doctrine.
Probably the earliest case, The Brig Aurora, failed to raise the delega-
tion issue in a distinct fashion; and its decision on the question did
little to guide the development of the doctrine.
Field v. Clark seems to have done more to hamper the developing
doctrine than any other case. The delegation issue was raised, and de-
cided, on the basis of very broad generalities. The most widely quoted
statement of the case, and a prime example of the broad and general
language to be found therein, is as follows:
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President
is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Consti-
tution.' 8
The language of Article I was never meant to be given so rigid a
formulation. To do so, would be to strip the Constitution of its
flexibility, vitality, and effectiveness. Yet, this language of Field has
come to be strictly interpreted, and for years the Court ritualistically
employed it. The language has come to stand for the narrow proposition
that legislative powers cannot be delegated. 19 It became routine for the
Court to invoke the language of Field-not to strike down delegations,
but to permit them. How could such an anomalous state of affairs be
reconciled? It was relatively easy. The Court became involved in a
labeling game. It became obvious that Congress could delegate any of
its powers that the Court did not choose to call legislative. 20 For a
period of time it even became fashionable for the Court to decide
16. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1913).
17. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
18. Id. at 692.
19. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 365, 385 (1906); Monongahela Bridge
Co.-v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 192 (1909); Unitel States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1910).
20. Fisher, Delegating Power to the President, 19 J. PUB. L. 251, 273 (1970).
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delegation cases by merely referring to prior cases which had invoked
the "non-legislative delegation" label. A prime example can be found
in First National Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co.21 where the
Court said:
[I]t is necessary to do no more than say that a contention which
was pressed in argument ... that the authority given by the section
... was void because conferring legislative power on the board, is
so plainly adversely disposed of by many previous adjudications as
to cause it to be necessary only to refer to them.2
The delegation decisions appear to be strictly result oriented; and the
cases have caused one writer to formulate the following syllogism:
(1) MAJOR PREMISE: Legislative power cannot be Constitu-
tionally delegated by Congress;
(2) MINOR PREMISE: It is essential that certain powers be
delegated to administrative offices and regulatory commissioners;
(3) CONCLUSION: therefore, the powers thus delegated are
not legislative powers.23
This seemingly result oriented approach, was the consequence of a
"zombie" like use of the language in Field. The process has been ex-
plained as follows:
It is interesting to note how often in the development of Anglo-
American law the courts have reached a conclusion quite in ac-
cordance with the duty then resting upon them of balancing the
interests involved; yet when the court is pressed to formulate the
grounds of the decision a reason is given which is applicable
neither logically or historically. When later judges decide new
phases of the same question they are apt to be led astray by a too
literal application of the supposed reason offered for the former
decision.24
If we are to understand the true decision-making processes of the
Court in the delegation cases, we must look behind the ritualistic
language invoked. Why does the Court sustain delegations of power?
The answer does not lie in the general language of Field; it lies in a
pragmatic evaluation of the necessities of government in relation to
separation of powers. In those cases which have upheld delegation of
power, the Court has obviously come to the conclusion that the delega-
21. 244 U.S. 416 (1916).
22. Id. at 427.
23. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 429 (1941).
24. Cheadle, supra note 12, at 893.
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tion involved is necessary for effective governmental operation; and
therefore must be sustained. It has been said that ."the courts classify
these cases in which power is delegated after the court has decided to
sustain or reject it, and the terms applied therefore become a sort of
ex post facto justification or prohibition, according as the thing is
deemed necessary or not. '25 The balancing of the everyday necessities
of government against the requirement of separation of powers has al-
ways been the essence of the Court's analytical process.
A more accurate statement of the previously mentioned syllogism
would be as follows:
(1) MAJOR PREMISE: it is essential that certain powers be dele-
gated to an executive, or administrative officer;
(2) MINOR PREMISE: legislative power should not be lightly
delegated lest it have a harmful effect on constitutional separation
of powers;
(3) CONCLUSION: pragmatic separation of powers will not for-
bid delegation when Congress has exercised its powers as far as is
practicable, and has chosen to delegate needed powers in order to
achieve effective governmental operation.
There is one early case-a contemporary of Field-in which the
underlying pragmatic separation of powers approach can be readily
seen. In the case of Wayman v. Southard26 the Judiciary Act of 17892
was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The Act gave the courts the power to regulate their practices and pro-
cedures. The delegation was upheld, with the Court per Chief Justice
Marshall saying:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those impor-
tant subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature
itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may
be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details.28
The Chief Justice was clearly satisfied that Congress had exercised as
much of its policy-making function as was necessary on the matter
of court procedures. Indeed, to require Congress to exercise greater
control over court procedures would have been to cripple the effective-
ness of the court system. Separation of powers could not possibly be
read so as to bring about this result. Marshall said:
25. Id. at 920.
26. 24 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
27. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
28. 24 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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That the legislature may transfer this discretion to the Courts, and
enable them to make rules for its regulation, will not, we presume,
be questioned.2
At the same time, Marshall could not say exactly where the line was
to be drawn between adequate congressional exercise of policy-making
power, and inadequate exercise of this power. He said:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislative makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary con-
strues the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to
the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary
of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry ... .30
Wayman differed greatly from Field in its approach. The Court
made an honest, realistic, and accurate statement of the separation-
delegation problem. The Court in Wayman admittedly did not have
the answer to the problem; but at least it was willing to face the
problem, and solve it on a case by case basis if necessary. Why the
Field approach was followed with more consistency than Wayman is
purely a matter of conjecture. The most probable answer is that the
early delegation cases involved what were clearly permissible delega-
tions. The necessity of the delegation so far outweighed the possible
effect on separation of powers that it did not even give rise to a sub-
stantial issue. 3' In cases of this type it was not necessary to apply the
more thoughtful approach of Wayman; it was sufficient to apply the
generalities of Field in order to sustain the delegation. When the Court
began to face more difficult delegation problems it could not deal with
them adequately. The Court was forced to move away from the Field
generalities, and toward a more open reliance on the pragmatic separa-
tion of powers approach.
Eventually the Court began to make attempts at establishing a rule
by which delegations could be judged as either valid or invalid. Two
cases indicative of the attempt are Buttfield v. Stranahan3 2 and J. W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States.33
In Buttfield the Court sought to establish a rule within the context of
the statement in Field-that legislative power could not be delegated.
This case involved the granting of authority to the Secretary of the
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 46.
31. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224, U.S. 194 (1911).
32. 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
33. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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Treasury to establish uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness
for tea being brought into the states. The Court upheld the delegation
on the grounds that the statute evidenced a congressional purpose to
exclude the lowest grades of tea. Chief Justice White said that Congress
had established a "primary standard, 3 4 and that "Congress had legis-
lated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable;"35 with the
Secretary being granted "the mere executive duty to effectuate the
legislative policy declared in the statute."36
The pragmatic approach of the Court is obvious, despite the cere-
monial incantations that the power delegated was not legislative.
Whether it was, or was not legislative, is unimportant. Although-
strictly as an aside-it would seem that the power to establish standards,
against which imported tea is to be judged, is closer to a legislative
function than to an executive one. Nevertheless, the pragmatic over-
tones are clear. It would be absurd to require Congress to establish
regulations for imported tea. Certainly there are more important
matters to which the Congress of the United States can devote its time.
As a practical matter, the Court would not, and should not think twice
about allowing such a delegation to stand.
Let us return to the rule which seems to be evolving out of this case.
The notion that Congress has established a "primary standard" seems
to be the key. What is the effect of fixing a primary standard? It cer-
tainly seems to imply some minimum amount of congressional policy
making. Yet the extent to which Congress would be required to exercise
its policy making power was unclear. The rule-in its ill defined state
was a very simple one-if Congress has established a primary standard,
then the delegation is valid. The movement away from Field and to-
ward a straightforward statement of the pragmatic approach had now
begun.
In the Hampton case, the Court was still attempting to formulate
some rule by which proper congressional policy making could be
distinguished from impermissible delegation. The rule of Hampton is
not greatly different from that of Buttfield. Instead of "primary stan-
dard," Hampton spoke of an "intelligible principle. '37 The Court per
Chief Justice Taft said:
34. 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized to .. .act is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.3 8
It is significant that the Court was still seeking a rule by which
congressional delegation could be judged; but of even greater signi-
ficance is that for the first time the Court was openly willing to admit
that Congress was in fact delegating legislative power. The Court's
specific language was-"such legislative action is not a forbidden dele-
gation of legislative power."39 At last the Court began to free itself from
the heretofore religiously applied statement of Field. At long last the
Court began to call a spade a spade. Now it would begin to more freely
approach the delegation problem, as it had in Wayman, on a purely
pragmatic basis.
It is interesting to note that the Court was virtually compelled to deny
the approach of Field. It was faced with a delegation which would not
allow itself to be labeled as non-legislative. The case was too difficult to
be handled by generalities. A solution to the case required a more
forthright statement of the problem, and some in depth analysis. To
cover up the delegation in Hampton by means of the old labeling game,
would have been simply stretching it too far.
The Hampton case involved the Tariff Act of 1922.40 The Act
provided:
[W]henever the President, upon investigation of the differences in
cost of production of articles wholly or in part the growth or pro-
duct of the United States and of like or similar articles wholly or in
part the growth or product of competing foreign countries, shall
find ... that the duties fixed in this act do not equalize the said
differences in costs of production in the United States and the
principle competing country he shall-ascertain said differences
and determine and proclaim the charges in classification or in-
creases or decreases in any rate of duty provided in this act. ...
The President was in effect given the authority to repeal existing
tariff rates and establish new ones. It would have been virtually im-
possible for the Court to refer to these powers as executive.
Beneath the shifting verbiage, it is fairly easy to spot the pragmatic
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858.
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analysis of the Court silently at work. The Congress had established a
tariff program designed to equalize production costs. Delegating the
power to update the tariff would have been the only practical alterna-
tive to constant congressional updating. This was the only way in which
such a "flexible tariff" program could have been made to work without
hopelessly tieing up Congress. Separation of powers would not be
invoked to strike down such a necessary delegation; nor would it be
invoked where the direct result would be a crippling of congressional
operations.
In 1935, the Court encountered two instances of delegation which it
deemed to be violative of the Constitution. These two famous cases are
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan4' and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States.42
These cases are significant for several reasons. They mark the first
and only time that a congressional delegation has been struck down.
These cases also evidence the continuing attempt by the Court to
establish a rule by which congressional delegations may be judged. And
finally, the cases demonstrate the ever increasing departure from the
imprecise language of the Field line of cases; while favoring a more
straightforward statement of the pragmatic approach being applied in
the decision making process.
Panama involved section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA).43 The President was given the power to prohibit, by ex-
ecutive order, the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum products withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted by state authority.
The Court, still in search of some rule by which delegations could be
judged, struck down section 9(c) because there was not a sufficient "stan-
dard" to be found in the statute. The Court said: "the Congress has
declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no
rule."44 From this statement, we once again see the notion that Congress
must, to some minimal degree, exercise its policy-making powers before
attempting to delegate any part of that power. Separation of powers re-
quires at least this much effort from the Congress. Unless it is forth-
coming, the necessities of government, however great, will not be
41. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
42. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
43. Act of July 2, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375.
44. 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
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deemed to outweigh separation of powers considerations. This feeling
was more than evident when the Court said:
If section 9(c) were held to be valid, it would be idle to pretend
that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the
Congress to delegate its law making function. The reasoning
of the many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous
and their distinction nugatory. Instead of performing its law mak-
ing function, the Congress could at will and as to such subjects
as it chose, transfer that function to the President or other offices
or to an administrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic
importance of the particular statute before us, but of the Constitu-
tional processes of legislation which are an essential part of our
system of government.45
From this language of the Court it becomes clear that "standards"
must accompany a statute, as evidence if you will, that Congress had
sufficiently exercised its policy-making power. Complete abdication of
responsibility is not acceptable, within the gambit of pragmatic separa-
tion of powers, even though the demands of governmental necessity
may be high.
Justice Cardozo dissented on the grounds that there were in fact
standards sufficient enough to save the statute. Although his is a dis-
senting opinion, it is important to note that Cardozo also applied the
pragmatic separation of powers approach-when he said:
[T]he separation of powers between the executive and Congress is
not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic vigor.
There must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical
necessities of government, which cannot foresee today the develop-
ments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety.46
The Schechter Poultry case involved section 3 of the NIRA. 4  This
section gave the President the power to prescribe "codes of fair com-
petition" for various trades and industries. Section 3 was also struck
down because of a lack of congressional "standards." With Schechter
reinforcing Panama, it appeared as though the Court had finally formu-
lated the rule it had been attempting to establish-a rule that would
permit the Court to judge delegation in a manner consistent with
governmental necessity and separation of powers. The rule being that
45. Id.
46. 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935).
47. Act of July 2, 1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375.
443
Duquesne Law Review
-Congress must exercise its policy-making powers at least to the extent
of providing standards to guide the manner and extent to which the
delegate would exercise the power granted. Without this minimal effort
on the part of Congress, separation of powers would be violated.
Justice Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama where he felt a suffi-
cient standard could have been inferred, joined the majority in
Schechter. He voiced his dissatisfaction with the manner in which
Congress had performed its legislative function saying:
[T]he delegated power of legislation which has found expression in
this code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflow-
ing. It is unconfined and vagrant .... Here, in the case before us,
is an attempted delegation not confined to any single act nor to
any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to
a standard. Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into
evils and upon discovery correct them. 48
There is much to be said for the rule of standards. 49 But, is it work-
able in all delegation cases; and is it always consistent with pragmatic
separation of powers analysis? In subsequent cases it is seen that stan-
dards were not always required to accompany delegations of legislative
power. This is not to say however, that the requirement of standards
has been completely abolished. It has not. There are certain instances
and cases in which a delegation of power could be ruinous to the con-
cept of separation of powers if not accompanied by legislative stan-
dards. Let us examine those cases in which the requirement of standards
has been relaxed.
Yakus v. United States50 decided the constitutionality of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942, 11 which directed the Price Adminis-
trator to establish regulations fixing maximum prices of commodities
and rents. The Act was passed during the Second World War, and was
an integral part of the overall war effort. It was designed to stabilize
the economic and civilian base upon which the military effort was
necessarily dependent. In order to achieve this goal, Congress was forced
to delegate broad and flexible powers.
Did pragmatic separation of powers require that standards accompany
this Emergency Price legislation? Clearly not. The necessity of effec.
48. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
49. See Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB.
L. REv. 469 (1968).
50. 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
51. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
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tively accomplishing wartime stabilization was so intense as to abrogate
the standards requirement. The effect on separation of powers was
miniscule compared to the necessity of a broad and flexible delegation
of legislative power designed to accomplish an important war time
policy. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
Congress to achieve the goal of war time stabilization without using the
vehicle of broad and flexible delegation of power. Under the circum-
stances, it was clear that Congress had done as much as was practical,
and had exercised the essentials of its policy-making function. The
Court indicated as much, when it said: The Constitution as a contin-
uously operative charter of government does not demand the impossi-
ble or the impracticable .... 52
Lichter v. United States53 evidences another situation in which the
requirement of legislative standards might be inconsistant with a prag-
matic approach to separation of powers. Lichter involved the Renegotia-
tion Act of 1942.54 This Act provided for the renegotiation of all con-
tracts made by the War Department, Navy Department, or Maritime
Commission. The renegotiation was to be carried out by the Secretary
of the department concerned. Like the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, the Renegotiation Act was an integral part of the overall war
effort. The purpose of the Act was to allow immediate production of
war materials pursuant to a contract which could later be renegotiated
and adjusted so as to eliminate any "excessive profits" which might
have resulted from the initial agreement.
The Renegotiation Act was attacked on the grounds that the delega-
tion it contained carried with it too slight a definition of legislative
policy and standards. The Court did not agree. The necessity of delegat-
ing power in order to accomplish the goal of swift, efficient, and eco-
nomical production of war materials far outweighed any possible threat
to constitutional separation of powers. The Court pointed out:
The degree to which Congress must specify its policies and stan-
dards in order that the administrative authority granted may not
be an unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power is
not capable of precise definition . . . . In time of crisis nothing
could be more tragic and less expressive of the intent of the people
than so to construe their Constitution that by its own terms it
52. 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1943).
53. 334 U.s. 742 (1948).
54. 50 U.S.C. § 1911 (1964).
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would substantially hinder rather than help them in defending
their national safety.55
Under such circumstances, requiring a delegation to be accompanied
by standards would not have advanced the purposes of the pragmatic
separation of powers concept. Much to the contrary, it would have run
afoul of that very concept. Therefore, it is not necessary for Congress to
supply a specific formula in a field where flexibility and the adoption
of the congressional policy in infinitely variable conditions constitutes
the essence of the program.
The view that there are instances of delegation not susceptible to the
degree of congressional policy-making required by the standards rule
can be seen in Arizona v. California.5" This case presented a situation
in which standards would have been exceedingly difficult to establish.
Under the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928,57 .the Secretary of the
Interior was given vast power to divide and make use of the waters of
the Colorado River. This was an exceptionally complex task, as was
pointed out by the Court:
All this vast interlocking machinery-a dozen major works deliver-
ing water according to Congressionally fixed priorities, for home,
agricultural, and industrial uses to people spread over thousands
of miles--could function effectively only under unitary manage-
ment. . . . Recognizing this, Congress put the Secretary of the
Interior in charge of these works and entrusted him with suffi-
cient power, principally the section 5 contract power, to direct,
manage, and coordinate their operation.5
Requiring the existence of standards on the face of this Act would
have been clearly inconsistent with the pragmatic separation of powers
approach. The need for administrative action pursuant to delegated
power was extremely high. If the goal which Congress sought to attain
by passage of the Boulder Canyon Act was to be realized, a broad dele-
gation of power was certainly necessary.
III. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS-STANDARDS?
The Yakas-Lichter-Arizona line of cases makes it clear that the
delegation doctrine, as it has continued to develop, does not require
55. 334 U.S. 742, 779-80 (1948).
56. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
57. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-17T (1964).
58. 373 U.S. 546, 589 (1963).
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standards in each and every case of delegation. But, this does not mean
that standards will not be required in certain categories, and instances
of delegation. Indeed, there are cases in which standards may be the
only possible means of achieving balance between governmental neces-
sity and separation of powers. It should be noted that the Court has
never declared an intent to abandon the Panama-Schechter rule of stan-
dards.59 It has treated these decisions as respected authority, and has
been careful to distinguish them. 60 In Kent v. Dulles,61 the Court went
so far as to read a statute restrictively in order to avoid a collision with
the rule of standards. 62 In Zemel v. Rusk,63 the Court sustained a delega-
tion on the grounds that a sufficient standard did exist.64
What role will standards play in the continuing development of the
delegation doctrine? When must a delegation be accompanied by stan-
dards; and in which cases will standards be unnecessary? It is suggested
by this writer that the answer will once again depend upon a pragmatic
separation of powers analysis. There will certainly be cases in which the
necessity of delegation is very high, while the effect on separation of
powers is fairly low-in which case, standards will not be required.
But, there will surely be cases in which the effect on separation of
powers will be more severe, and the necessity of delegation less demand-
ing--in which case, standards may be required if the delegation is to
be sustained. Such a state of affairs would seem to destroy any semblance
of a rule regarding delegation. However, there is a very simple rule
which may be readily inferred-the rule that Congress must endeavor
to exercise as much of its policy-making power as it possibly can, within
the practical limitations of the field in which it seeks to delegate. All
the relevant factors bearing upon the need for particular delegation
must be weighed against its effect on separation of powers.
The final determination as to whether standards will be required to
accompany a delegation of power will depend to a large extent on the
person or body who is to be the recipient of that power. There are
three broad classes of recipients of congressionally delegated powers; and
delegations to them have varying effects on the separation of powers
principle. The three broad classifications are as follows: (1) agencies
created by the Congress, and invested with congressional powers of
59. Merrill, supra note 49, at 472.
60. Id.
61. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
62. Merrill, supra note 49, at 472.
63. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
64. Merrill, supra note 49, at 472.
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regulation over a given field (e.g., F.C.C., I.C.C.); (2) departments or
agencies organized under the Executive Department, and vested with
powers largely originating in the office of the Presidency (e.g. the
various cabinet level offices); and, (3) the President of the United States.
If one considers these broad classifications in the order in which they
are enumerated, it can readily be seen there exists a natural sliding
scale. An increase in the centralization of governmental powers is
reflected as one moves from a delegation of power to an administrative
agency to a delegation of power to the President.
As has already been said, pragmatic separation of powers involves
a balancing of governmental necessity (the element which demands that
a delegation be made), with the effect the delegation will have on the
separation of powers principle; with legislative standards being a means
of assuring that a pragmatic balance has been struck in those cases
which pose a major threat to separation of powers.
As the negative effect on separation of powers diminishes, the balance
naturally swings in favor of the demands of governmental necessity,
and the need for standards correspondingly diminishes. This is borne
out by the Lichter-Yakus-Arizona line of cases which relaxed the re-
quirement of standards. Lichter and Yakus involved delegations of
power to an administrative agency created by Congress. The Arizona
case involved a delegation of power to the Secretary of the Interior, thus
falling into the second classification mentioned above.
A delegation of power to an administrative agency is unlikely to give
rise to a meaningful threat to the separation of powers principle; and
for this reason the existence of accompanying standards is of minor im-
portance. Delegating power to an administrative agency tends to de-
centralize governmental power-spreading it over an enlarged base of
governmental activity and organization. The logic of separating power
is the logic of governmental checks and balances. By delegating to an
administrative agency, governmental power is further polarized.
The primary consideration, when examining a delegation of power
to an administrative agency, is not that of separation of powers, but that
of accountability. Stnadards'may at times be necessary to assure adminis-
trative accountability to Congress, but such instances will be rare-and
generally speaking, a delegation to an administrative agency accom-
panied by standards, will not be necessary to assure either accounta-
bility or proper separation of powers. Administrative agencies created
by Congress are in effect arms of the legislative branch, and as such are
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inherently dependent upon the Congress for their future existence and
power. Such a relationship carries with it an inherent element of
accountability.
The need for adequate accountability was amply stated in Yakus
when the Court said that a delegation would be valid so long as it
"sufficiently marks the field within which the administrator is to act so
that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with
the legislative will." 65 From this case it becomes clear that the issue of
accountability is of primary importance when judging the validity of
delegation to an agency. Inherent in the need for accountability is the
need for an adequate basis for judicial review of agency action taken
pursuant to the authority granted. So construed, accountability involves
a twofold concept. Direct accountability to Congress itself; and account-
ability to Congress, through the courts, which have the responsibility
of checking ultra-vires activities of the agency.
The Arizona case involved a delegation of power to the head of an
executive department (the Secretary of the Interior)-yet the require-
ment of standards was relaxed in this case much as it was in Lichter and
Yakus. The Arizona case seems to reflect a propensity to treat delegations
of power to a congressionally created administrative agency in a manner
similar to the delegation of power to an executive department. Such
an approach is entirely understandable. Despite the fact a delegation
of power to an executive department may tend to centralize govern-
mental power, much as a delegation to the President would, it is likely
that the degree of centralization will be minimal because of the es-
sentially autonomous nature of those departments. Although the various
department heads are appointed by the President, and are directly
accountable to him, the departmental staffs are primarily composed of
career bureaucrats who enjoy a significant degree of independence and
autonomy.
Except where a delegation of power to an executive department
clearly reflects a propensity toward over-centralization within the total-
ity of the executive branch, such a delegation should be treated much
the same as a delegation to a congressionally created administrative
agency.
Despite the accountability which exists between administrative agen-
cies and the Congress, there nevertheless remains a problem with un-
guided discretionary power. Professor Kenneth C. Davis has suggested
65. 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1943).
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that standards do not provide the best means of dealing with the
problem of discretionary power in the hands of administrative agencies.
In his treatise on administrative law,66 Professor Davis recommends that
the requirement of standards be abandoned in favor of procedural
limitations and due process of law considerations as a means of guarding
against the abuse of delegated power. His suggestion places the onus on
the administrative agency to set forth standards which will limit its
use of discretionary power, while at the same time it provides an ele-
ment of fundamental fairness. In accordance with this approach, a court
reviewing the validity of power delegated to an administrative agency
will look to these considerations, and not to the existence of standards.
Having seen there is only a minor separation of powers problem sur-
rounding the delegation of power to an administrative agency, it is
apparent that the approach presented by Davis is far superior to the
traditional requirement of standards as a means of assuring account-
ability and prevention of discretionary abuse.
Delegating power to the President, however, raises a more important
and fundamental problem than that of acountability or discretionary
abuse. It raises the separation of powers problem in its purest sense.
We have noted that delegating power to an administrative agency oper-
ates to decentralize governmental power; and conversely, we must be
aware that delegating power to the President involves a centralization
of power which poses a direct threat to the separation of powers theory.
It should be noted that the only two cases in which congressional
delegations of power have been struck down involved delegations of
power to the President, which were not accompanied by adequate stan-
dards. It is equally significant to note that while the Court has relaxed
the requirement of standards in cases involving delegations of power to
administrative agencies, it has not endeavored to overrule the Panama
and Schechter decisions, or relax the requirement of standards applied
in those cases.
The importance of this distinction is clear-while delegations to
administrative agencies and executive departments pose a relatively
slight threat to constitutional separation of powers, broad and un-
guided delegations to the President pose a more meaningful threat, and
should be accompanied by more meaningful congressional standards.
Over the last fifty years there has been an ever increasing trend to-
ward centralization of governmental powers in the hands of the
66. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 52-53 (Supp. 1970).
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President. The trend appears to be irreversible. Past and current
emergencies and necessities, coupled with myriad economic, political,
and social factors, have tipped the balance of power toward the Chief
Executive.6 7 Expansion of the executive branch has in many instances
resulted in the subservience of Congress or in congressional acceptance
of a lesser position in the affairs of their nation. 6 Certainly Congress
must take the initiative in maintaining its position as an equal branch
of government. But, where it fails to do so by making overly broad
delegations of power to the President-it is encumbent upon the courts
to assure that constitutional separation of powers is not subverted. When
faced with the type of delegation which carries ominous implications
for separation of powers, the Court would be remiss in failing to strike
down such a delegation if it were not accompanied by meaningful stan-
dards.
IV. THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,69 (hereinafter referred to
as Act) has granted to the President vast powers over the economy. He
has been given power to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries.
Pursuant to the power granted him by the statute, the President is-
sued an Executive Order7" freezing wages and prices for a period of 90
days. Following this initial action, the President issued another Execu-
tive Order 7' establishing a complex system of wage and price controls
to be administered by a Cost of Living Council.72 Various commissions
and boards, such as the Pay Board and the Price Commission, were
established under the Council in order to perform the day-to-day
function of controlling the economy.
It is significant to note that the Act makes no mention of the power
to declare a 90 day wage price freeze, nor is there a provision for a
Cost of Living Council. Because of the broad language of the Act, and
the vast power granted by it, the actions taken by the President can not
be said to be in violation of the Act. With this in mind, the issue is
the extent to which such a broad delegation of power can be said to
be consistent with the principle of pragmatic separation of powers.
67. Forkosch, supra note 3, at 532.
68. Id.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1904, note (1964).
70. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
71. Exec. Order No. 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20139 (1971).
72. Id., The Cost of Living Council was created by Exec. Order No. 11627.
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What is the effect of such a broad delegation on constitutional separa-
tion of powers? In relation to the problem which Congress sought to
remedy, how necessary is such a broad delegation of powers? Can it
be said that Congress adequately exercised its duty and its power to
effectuate policy in the area of economic stabilization? Are there suffi-
cient "standards" on the face of the Act to indicate that Congress has
adequately exercised its policy making function, and to give guidance
to the power delegated by the Act?
These are the questions which must be answered when considering
the validity of the delegation found in the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970. In order to get a feel for the problem presented, it is necessary
to look briefly at some of the factors which will have a direct bearing
upon the determination to be made.
The Act involves a delegation of power to the President, and this
is a very important factor. It has already been noted that a delegation
to the President involves an inherent centralization of governmental
powers, and therefore poses a very real threat to the constitutional
separation of powers principle. An extremely broad delegation of
power, without standards, greatly compounds the threat, and can only
be justified by compelling circumstances.
Can it justifiably be said that the economic situation facing the
nation required the granting of broad unlimited powers to the Presi-
dent as a means of dealing with the problem? Rising inflation of the
cost-push variety, unemployment, and an increasing trade deficit were
the problems which faced the Congress, and led to the passage of the
Act.
Congress is undeniably ill equipped to fully develop a comprehen-
sive system of economic stabilization. Even if it were possible, it would
probably be undesirable. An effective system of economic stabilization
must be built on a flexible base. This can only be accomplished by a
certain freedom of administration. Hence, an overly rigid delegation of
power, designed to accomplish the goal of economic stabilization, would
probably be totally ineffective.
While a certain flexibility of power is necessary because of congres-
sional inadequacies, it can not be said that Congress is totally lacking
in ability to develop some basic policy to guide the flexible powers
which it places in the hands of the President. Some standards reflecting
congressional policy guidance could surely be drawn up to guide the
course of a successful system of economic stabilization.
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One must look to the Act itself in order to determine whether Con-
gress did in fact fulfill its duty to effectuate policy, and to give guidance
to the President. Are there any "standards" evident on the face of the
statute which might indicate congressional policy and guidance?
The text of the Economic Stabilization Act is as follows:
Sec. 201. Short title-This title may be cited as the 'Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970.'
Sec. 202. Presidential Authority-(a) The President is autho-
rized to issue such orders and regulations as he may deem appro-
priate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries at levels not
less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970. Such orders and regu-
lations may provide for the making of such adjustments as may be
necessary to provide gross inequities.
Sec. 203. Delegation-The President may delegate the perfor-
mance of any function under this title to such officers, departments,
and agencies of the United States as he may deem appropriate.
Sec. 204. Penalty-Whoever willfully violates any order or
regulation under this title shall be fined not more than $5,000.
Sec. 205. Injunctions-Whenever it appears to any agency of
the United States, authorized by the President to exercise the
authority contained in this section to enforce orders and regula-
tions issued under this title, that any person has engaged, is en-
gaged, or is about to engage in any acts or practices constituting
a violation of any regulation or order under this title, it may in
its discretion bring an action, in the proper district court of the
United States or the proper United States court of any territory
or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to
enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a per-
manent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be
granted without bond. Upon application of the agency, any such
court may also issue mandatory injunctions commanding any per-
son to comply with any regulation or order under this title.
Sec. 206. Expiration.-The authority to issue and enforce orders
and regulations under this title expires at midnight April 30, 1972,
but such expiration shall not affect any proceeding under section
204 for a violation of any such order or regulation, or for the
punishment for contempt committed in the violation of any in-
junction issued under section 205, committed prior to May 1,
1972.
An amendment to section 202 of the Act is as follows:
(b) The authority conferred on the President by this section
shall not be exercised with respect to a particular industry or seg-
ment of the economy unless the President, after taking into ac-
count the seasonal nature of the employment, the rate of
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employment or underemployment, and other mitigating factors,
that prices or wages in that industry or segment of the economy
have increased at a rate which is grossly disproportionate to the
rate at which prices or wages have increased in the economy
generally.
There are two standards which readily appear on the face of the
statute. Section 202 established the level at which prices, rents, wages,
and salaries are to be stabilized. Such a provision clearly provides
guidance for the President, and is some evidence of a congressional
effort to fulfill its policy making duties. An amendment to the original
act, found in section 202(b), restricts the application of wage and price
controls to a single industry unless the President determines that the
prices or wages in that industry have increased at a disproportionate
rate. This amendment provides a standard which does much to
strengthen the otherwise standardless nature of the Act in its original
form.
Except for the limitation as to the level at which prices and wages
are to be stabilized, and the limitation on selective application of con-
trols, there are no other standards to be found on the face of the
statute.
Should the Congress have provided other standards to guide the
course of economic stabilization; or, are the above mentioned standards
sufficient to sustain the delegation? Should Congress have provided
some guidance in regards to the all important questions of "how" and
"when" stabilization is to be carried out?
In examining the sufficiency or insufficiency of the standards which
accompany the Act, it is wise to do so in perspective. Since there have
been only two instances in which delegated power has been found to
be lacking in sufficient standards, it might be helpful to briefly com-
pare those situations to the delegation in the Act. It is therefore im-
portant to look for a moment at those portions of the NIRA which
were struck down in Panama and Schechter.
The Panama decision struck down section 9(c) of the NIRA which
provided in part:
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in
interstate commerce and foreign commerce of petroleum . . . in
excess of the amount to be produced or withdrawn from storage
by any state law or order prescribed thereunder .... 73
73. Act of July 2, 1925, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375.
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This provision granted to the President the power to prohibit ship-
ments of "hot oil" in interstate commerce. It should be noted that
"what" constituted "hot oil" was to be determined not by the Presi-
dent, but by state law or regulation. It should also be noted that the
power delegated to the President-the power of prohibition-was a
very specific power which was to be applied to a very narrow subject.
Although the Court, in an 8-1 decision, felt no standard could be
found in section 9(c), it is at least arguable that a standard did exist
because of the narrow area in which the power was to be used. The
major inadequacy to be found in section 9(c) is the lack of guidance
as to "when" the power of prohibition was to be exercised.
The Economic Stabilization Act suffers from a similar deficiency-
that is, an uncertainty as to "when" the power of the Act is to be exer-
cised. Economic stabilization was not made mandatory by the Act and
power to determine when the controls were to be applied was left
exclusively in the hands of the President.
Moreover, the power granted under the Act is not limited to a
narrow subject area, nor is the action to be taken as specific as it was
under section 9(c). A grant of power to determine "when" to prohibit
the transportation of "hot oil" is exceedingly more limited than the
Stabilization Act's power to determine "when" and "how" to stabilize
and control the trillion dollar economy of the United States. The
grant of power found in the Act clearly outstrips that found in section
9(c), and is more analagous to the vastness of power granted under
section 3 of the NIRA.
Section 3 of the NIRA gave the President the power to prescribe
"codes of fair competition for various trades and industries." There
was no mention in the Act of what constituted "unfair competition,"
nor was there any mention of "how" such a determination was to be
made. This provision of the NIRA is similar to the provisions of the
Stabilization Act because the latter grants a broad power to impose
broad controls over the entire economy. By unanimous decision in the
Schechter case, section 3 was struck down as a broad delegation of
power without sufficient accompanying standards.
It is clear that the Stabilization Act involves a delegation at least as
broad as that of section 3, and much broader than that found in
section 9(c), of the NIRA. It must also be said that the Stabilization
Act, in light of the two standards which can be found on its face, has
little more in the way of legislative guidance than did the NIRA pro-
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visions. It is doubtful whether these two standards, as minimal as they
are, are sufficient to save the broad delegation found in the Act. The
Act still grants a vast amount of unguided power; power to determine
the most important aspects of stabilization policy-namely the "how"
and "when" of economic controls.
Having seen there is a grave question concerning the sufficiency of
the standards which can be found on the face of the Act, let us assume,
for the purpose of further analysis, that the Act is lacking in sufficient
standards. Is it possible that the Act may still be valid? Might it be
possible for the Court to "construct standards" by reference to the
legislative history of the Act, and by reference to past experience in the
field of economic controls?
The decision in Kent v. Dulles74 would seem to indicate that such an
approach is feasible. In Kent, the Court employed this very approach-
it developed "constructive standards" where the statute in question
contained no standards on its face.
Kent involved the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, T7 which
required the issuance of a passport for foreign travel; and the Act of
July 3, 192676 which gave the Secretary of State the authority to issue
passports. These statutes gave the Secretary very broad powers over
the issuance of passports. Pursuant to the powers granted him, the
Secretary issued a regulation which prohibited the issuance of a pass-
port to a communist.
The Court held that the Secretary could not deny passports on the
basis of a person's beliefs and associations. But, rather than striking
down the statute, the Court looked at the long line of congressional
acts which had operated to regulate passports (going as far back as 1803)
in order to construct a standard for the 1952 Act. The Court also con-
sidered an equally long line of executive department decisions, rulings,
and regulations. The Court sought to determine whether it could
impute to Congress an intended policy which might operate as a
standard.
Although the language of the 1952 Act may have been exceedingly
broad, the traditional power over passports had long been very narrow.
Refusal of passports had traditionally been based on two factors: (1)
74. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1964).
76. Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 43, 44 Stat. 887.
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lack of citizenship, and (or) denial of allegiance to the United States;
and, (2) engaging in unlawful conduct. These factors became "con-
structive standards" for the 1952 Act.
The Court said:
Yet, so far as relevant here, those two are the only ones which it
could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior
administrative standards. . . . We therefore, hesitate to impute
to Congress ... a purpose to give unbridled discretion to grant or
withold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he
may choose. 77
If the Stabilization Act is to be sustained as a valid delegation of
legislative power there will almost certainly have to be a judicial
construction of standards. The standards which do exist on the face
of the statute provide grossly inadequate guidance for the vast power
which is granted. Permitting the grant of such power, without finding
some legislative guidance, would have a devastating effect on the
principle of separation of powers. If a pragmatic separation of powers
is to be maintained, the Court must honestly endeavor to fill in the
"standards gap" which exists on the face of the statute. In order to do
so the Court must be able, upon examination of the legislative history
as well as past legislative experience in the field of economic controls, to
perceive elements of legislative guidance and limitation.
It is important to note that the first case in which the constitutionality
of the delegation has been questioned, was decided primarily on the
grounds that adequate standards could in fact be constructed. In
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers of North America, AFL-CIO
v. Connally,78 a three judge district court panel found the delegation in
the Act to be constitutional. The court found that there are two stan-
dards on the face of the statute-the "level of stabilization" standard of
section 202, and the "uniformity of application" standard of section
202(b). The court also found that additional standards could be deduced
from the legislative history of the Act, and from legislative experience
in the field of wage and price controls. Although the court placed great
emphasis on the existence of these two standards, it felt compelled to
examine the legislative history and past legislative experience in order
to sustain the constitutionality of the challenged delegation. Specifi-
77. 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
78. 29 AD. L.2D 493 (D. D.C. 1971).
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cally, the court examined the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, T7
and Title IV of the Defense Production Act of 1950. 0
In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on Yakus v. United
States, which upheld the constitutionality of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942. The court examined the decision in Yakus and
the 1942 Act in order to determine whether it could yield some indica-
tion of that which Congress sought to accomplish by passage of the
1970 Act.
Although the court was correct in referring to Yakus in an attempt
to search out standards for the 1970 Act, it relied far too heavily on the
rationale of that case. The district court treated Yakus as though it were
on "all fours" with the case before them. Clearly it is not. There are
two important factors which distinguish the passage of the 1942 Act
from the passage of the 1970 Act. Both factors bear heavily on the
pragmatic separation of powers theory. The 1942 Act delegated power
to a Price Administrator who was to promulgate the various price
regulations; while the 1970 Act delegated stabilization powers to the
President. The 1942 Act was passed as an integral part of a major
war effort; while the 1970 Act was not passed as part of a war effort, but
as part of a purely economic program. The necessities which militated
in favor of the respective delegations of power can not be said to be the
same. Similarly, a delegation of power to the President is not the same
as the delegation of power to a Price Administrator, for it carries with
it more substantial consequences for the separation of powers principle.
In referring to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, and Title
IV of the Defensive Production Act of 1950, the court agreed with the
essentials of the government's contention that there exists a sufficient
background of prior law and practice from which adequate standards
for the 1970 Act can be deduced. The court said:
The historical context of the 1970 law is emphasized in the Gov-
ernment's submission: "In enacting the legislation in question
here, Congress was, of course, acting against a background of wage
and price controls in two wars. The Administrative practice under
both of those Acts was the subject of extensive judicial interpreta-
tion and review. This substantial background of prior law and
practice provides a further framework for assessing whether the
Executive has stayed within the bounds authorized by Congress
and provides more than adequate standards for the exercise of the
79. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
80. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2101-02 (1964).
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authority granted by the Act." We think this contention is
sound.81
The court reviewed the legislative history of the 1970 Act to
buttress its finding that it was meant to be guided by the experience
gained from the 1942 and 1950 experiments in the field of wage and
price controls. The court said:
Plainly the 1970 legislative purpose set forth in the House Report
does not differ in material degree from the statement of legislative
purpose in the 1942 legislation upheld in Yakus. This purpose was
reiterated in debate on the 1970 act.82
There is, however, a major problem presented by the district court's
decision. Although it concluded that, taken within the context of
history, there are in fact standards to be found for the 1970 Act-it
did not specify what those standards are, nor what limitations are im-
posed by them. The court merely held that what the President
had done thus far did not exceed that which had been done pursuant
to prior wage and price legislation. Such a determination may be en-
tirely correct, but it does little to define the standards which are to
govern future action under the 1970 Act.
Clearly, the court did not hold that action taken pursuant to the
1942 and 1950 Acts constitutes the outer limits of action permissible
under the 1970 Act. The court said:
We do not suggest that the 1970 law was intended as or consti-
tutes a duplicate of the earlier laws .... The approaches and de-
cisions under the earlier laws are certainly not frozen as guidelines
for the present law. 83
There appears to be a certain dichotomy in the decision of the
district court. On the one hand, the court has held that the 1942 and
1950 Acts provide a context of standards which can be applied to the
1970 Act. On the other hand, the court held that action taken pursuant
to the 1970 Act will not be limited by the prior statutes. This is similar
to saying-the prior Acts provide standards, but the 1970 Act is not
bound by those standards, This dichotomy can only be removed by
a clear statement of those standards which can be inferred from the
prior legislation. Only in this way can it be said there is a tangible
81. 29 AD. L.2D 493, 502 (D. D.C. 1971).
82. Id. at 505.
83. Id. at 503.
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measure of guidance provided by the prior laws. It is regrettable that
the district court failed to clearly enunciate those standards which it
found to exist in support of the Economic Stabilization Act.
CONCLUSION
Should the Supreme Court decide to rule on the constitutionality of
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, it is almost certain that they
will employ the same basic approach which was applied by the district
court in the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case. The Court will certainly
find it most difficult to sustain the delegation solely on the strength of
those standards which can be found on the face of the statute. The
Court will necessarily turn to the technique of constructing standards
in order to fill in the gap which exists.
If the Supreme Court sustains the validity of the delegation on the
grounds that adequate standards can be inferred, it is hoped they will
also do that which the district court failed to do. Hopefully, the Supreme
Court will clearly enunciate those standards which it finds to be in
support of the power delegated by the Economic Stabilization Act. By
so doing, the Court will be reinforcing, and sustaining, a governmental
system based on the theory of pragmatic separation of powers.
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